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ABSTRACT
The ‘crowding-out’ and the ‘decline of the family’ hypotheses are the
fundamental theoretical notions underlying the literature on cross-country
differences in informal support. In this study, we expand upon these notions
to develop and test the premise that cultural context shapes European’s views
about an often overlooked source of support: non-kin. We carefully
conceptualise cultural context as individualistic values and familialistic norms.
Employing multilevel multinomial models and European Quality of Life Survey
data from 27 countries, we confirm the importance of decomposing the
broader notion of culture by demonstrating that contexts with both less
pronounced individualistic values and less pronounced familialistic norms are
conducive to non-kin rather than kin or professional help. Moreover, unlike
prior work, which suggested the existence of a north/west-south/east divide
in support patterns, our findings show nuanced cross-national differences in
the importance of non-kin ties as a source of advice and help when looking
for a job. We find some of the highest levels of non-kin reliance in countries
in southern and eastern Europe, and in northern and western Europe more
generally. We conclude by proposing ways in which future research can
advance our understanding of the role of context in shaping support patterns.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 26 April 2016; Accepted 9 November 2017
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1. Introduction
Modernisation theory gave rise to two key hypotheses – ‘crowding-out’
and ‘the decline of the family’ – which have largely underpinned research
on cross-country differences in informal support. In this study, we argue
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that these hypotheses have systematically glossed over the role of non-kin
ties as a source of support and its link with cultural context. Moreover,
unlike prior comparative work which has often treated cultural context
as a black box (Nonnenmacher and Friedrichs 2013), we plea for a
careful conceptualisation of culture, highlighting the importance of differ-
entiating between familialistic norms and individualistic values. To
conduct this research, we distinguish between three key sources of
support – kin, non-kin and professionals – and focus on two types of
support, namely advice and help when looking for a job.
To distinguish between support from members of the personal network
and support received through institutional distributions and market
exchanges, scholars have introduced the contrast between informal and
formal support. Informal support is an unpaid help that is provided by
family ties (that is consanguine and legal ties such as parents, spouse, chil-
dren and siblings) and/or non-kin ties (ties that are neither biologically
nor legally bond such as friends, neighbours, colleagues and acquain-
tances). Formal support encompasses institutional distributions and
market exchanges and is provided by professionals or people who are
trained and paid to assist others.
Support has many definitions applied in different fields of research
ranging from sociology and anthropology, to psychology, to nursing
and medicine. Embedded in the sociological enquiry, we understand
support as the (potential) behavioural exchanges between network ties,
which are intended as helpful and are also perceived as such (Dykstra
2016). Exchanges can take different forms, with some of the most impor-
tant ones being instrumental and financial aid, emotional concerns and
advice, and (physical) care (Wellman and Wortley 1990).
Support can also be subsumed under actual and potential, where actual
support can be provided by one or multiple sources of support, whereas
potential support refers to one’s personal views about who is the
optimal source of support (Messeri et al. 1993). Our research addresses
European country differences in these views by probing into the role of
cultural context in determining non-kin rather than kin or professionals
as the optimal source of support.
Actual support provision and views on potential support differ across
European countries. These country differences are embedded in two
lines of enquiry, which have remained empirically largely separated.
The first line relates to institutional context and follows the notion of
the so-called crowding-out hypothesis. The crowding-out hypothesis
posits that welfare advancement will crowd out informal social networks
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and caring relations, which will in turn promote self-centeredness and a
gradual decline of commitment to civic norms (Fukuyama 2000). Scholars
in this field of enquiry have heavily focused on the distinction between
formal and informal support. The second line of enquiry revolves
around cultural context and suggests that rising individualism goes
hand in hand with economic growth and welfare advancement (Hama-
mura 2012), and ultimately results in the decline of the family. The
decline of the family is suggested to exist in three domains: family struc-
ture (e.g. decline of marriage), behaviour (e.g. decline in support
exchanges within the family) and culture (e.g. decline of family norms
and values) (Popenoe 1993; Silverstein and Giarrusso 2011).
The distinction between formal, informal and family support stemming
from these two theoretical approaches is largely mirrored in empirical
findings on cross-country differences, which have glossed over the
nature and mechanics of non-kin support. Broadly speaking, it has been
shown that, compared with northern and western European elderly,
southern and eastern European elderly are less likely to rely on formal,
or on a combination of formal and informal care (Haberkern and
Szydlik 2010; Suanet et al. 2012). The scarcity of formal care, and
support more generally, in the south and east of Europe has been indica-
tive of the importance of informal support in the region. However, prior
research merely focusing on informal support has revealed that people in
the northern and western European countries, and not those in southern
and eastern Europe, are more likely to rely on informal help (Kääriäinen
and Lehtonen 2006; Hank and Stuck 2008). Family sociologists explain
this phenomenon by demonstrating that in the north and west of
Europe people more often exchange support within the nuclear family,
but people in southern and eastern Europe more often engage in intensive
care and support, largely so because of less generous public spending
(Brandt 2013) tailored with legal (Saraceno and Keck 2010) and normative
obligations to the family (Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008).
Only four comparative studies inform us about potential (Pichler and
Wallace 2007; Gelissen et al. 2012) and actual non-kin support in
Europe (Höllinger and Haller 1990; Gesthuizen et al. 2008). Their findings
reveal a similar to informal support north/west-south/east divide.
Embedded in the crowding-out hypothesis, these studies have also
shown that cross-country differences in non-kin reliance are linked with
country levels of welfare provision, where generous social spending is
positively associated with potential support from non-kin (Gelissen
et al. 2012) but is negatively associated with actual support provision
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(Gesthuizen et al. 2008). This prior comparative work on non-kin ties
reflects contemporary European differences in (potential) non-kin
support in the light of welfare provision, but it fails to situate non-relatives
in the larger support system. Consequently, questions such as how non-
kin support compares to that of kin and professionals remain open.
In this contribution, we set out to answer this question and argue that,
besides institutional context, cultural context provides a theoretical
grounding for understanding the relative role of non-kin ties as a source
of support. Prior work on the role of cultural context has been limited
to the family decline hypothesis and has thus extensively focused on
family norms (i.e. Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008; Haberkern and Szydlik
2010). Family norms, however, are only part of a broader system of indi-
vidualism, with deep-rooted values of autonomy and independence which
serve as a guiding principle in different domains of life (Schwartz 2007). In
Section 2 and 3, we elaborate on the concept of cultural context and argue
that values of autonomy and independence, along with norms of family
obligations, shape people’s views about the role of non-kin in their
support system.
We conduct multilevel multinomial analysis employing European
Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) data from 27 countries. Prior studies oper-
ationalised support by a ‘general support’ measure (i.e. an index of
support) or types of support that belong to the family domain (i.e.
demanding care, and practical and financial support). However, the
task-specific model postulates that kin, non-kin and professionals serve
different functions (Litwak and Szelenyi 1969). Kin ties are often strong,
and normatively and legally obliged to care and provide for each other,
whereas, non-kin ties are defined by voluntary interaction and are best
equipped to provide types of support that entail value similarity and
access to resources.1 Our analyses rest, therefore, on two types of non-
kin pertinent support – advice and help when looking for a job – and
we examine conditions under which people are more likely to turn to
(a) non-kin rather than kin, and (b) non-kin rather than professionals.
2. Conceptualising cultural context
For all that is written in sociology about rising individualism and its power
in explaining country differences, the discussion has remained largely
1Although lacking the normative prescriptions for doing so, non-kin ties can also serve as a source of care
and instrumental aid. Such support exchanges occur primarily amongst older people when the usual
primary providers – their family members – are not available (Messeri et al. 1993).
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qualitative. Most of the empirical work on the impact of cultural context
on support patterns stems from the field of family sociology. In that field,
however, individualism has been often equated with the concept of famili-
alism, as evinced by the long-lasting tradition of dividing Europe into
‘more individualistic’ northern and western European countries and
‘more familialistic’ southern and eastern European countries (Reher
1998; Viazzo 2010). Whilst we concede that individualism and its opposite
collectivism are linked with familialism, we argue that they are different
approaches to culture and understanding cultural context. Individualism
and familialism also differ in their relationship with institutional context.
According to the ‘The Big Three’ of cross-cultural studies – Hofstede,
Schwartz and Inglehart – cultural context can be defined as a broader
system of basic, deep-rooted values which serve as a guiding principle
in life. Individualism is one dimension in this system and entails values
of independence and autonomy. These values have the power to explain
the diversity of practices across countries and underlie within-country,
specific norms and attitudes in specific domains of social life, such as
the family (Ester et al. 2006; Schwartz 2007). Hence, familialism, when
defined as family norms, can be seen as influenced by levels of individual-
ism and as a more specific approach to culture with explanatory power
limited to kin practices.2 Unlike basic values which reflect what people
truly believe is right to do, norms reflect shared expectations about
what members of a society should or should not do (Schwartz 2012).
A key feature of cultural context as a system of values is that it can persist
for centuries and changes only slowly (Hamamura 2012). This means that
the potential impact of institutional arrangements such as social security
provisions on individualism is likely to take a long time to materialise
(Inglehart et al. 2017). Yet, it is also important to note that the existence
and preservation of values of independence and autonomy are likely to
depend upon the welfare state functioning as a safeguarding system. Ingle-
hart (1997) empirically corroborates this notion by demonstrating that
post-materialist values, including autonomy and independence, become
more salient in societies whose existential security is ensured.
2Note that familialism is often associated with collectivism – that is the opposite of individualism. Yet,
whereas familialism tends to be conceptualised in the framework of the nuclear family and intergenera-
tional relationships, collectivism extends to include the extended family and one’s larger community
(Oyserman et al. 2002). As yet, three studies addressed empirically the link between familialism and col-
lectivism, albeit with inconclusive evidence. In short, Gaines et al. (1997) argued that familialism is sep-
arate from collectivism, Lay et al. (1998) suggested that familialism is an essential core of collectivism,
and Rhee et al. (1996) advocated that familialism is an important element of collectivism but distinct
from a non-kin–focused type of collectivism.
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Familialism, on the other hand, is tightly linked with institutional
context. As argued by Dykstra (forthcoming) the generosity or restricted-
ness of public provisions variably releases or necessitates normative obli-
gations. Release from family obligations is likely to occur in countries
where public assistance is provided in kind rather than in cash, whereas
necessity is more likely in contexts where social security is provided in
cash rather than in kind. Moreover, the should-element carried by
norms of family obligations is reinforced by legal obligations. Haberkern
and Szydlik (2010) have, for example, argued that normative and legal
obligations often coincide, making it difficult to disentangle their
impact. Normative and legal obligations are sometimes conflated and
examined in the form of typologies, such as Leitner’s (2003) and Saraceno
and Keck’s (2010) typologies.
Diverging from prior practices of studying culture, we examine both
individualistic values and norms of family obligations. In so doing, we
are able to separate the effect of what people truly believe is right to do
from the effect of what people feel they are expected to do given the
current institutional environment in which they are embedded. For the
sake of parsimony and considering the focus of this contribution,
namely cultural context, we will, however, not develop and test hypotheses
about the direct effect of welfare provision.
3. Links between cultural context and non-kin support
The defining features of individualistic and collectivistic cultures revolve
around the notion of dependency between individuals. According to
cross-cultural research, in more collectivistic cultures people are interde-
pendent: they view the welfare of their larger community as central to the
concept of the self (Triandis 1993; Gaines et al. 1997) and strive to main-
tain a sense of solidarity and harmony through fulfilment of their obli-
gation to the group. This sense of solidarity and harmony is,
furthermore, sustained through heightened sensitivity to the needs of
community’s members, empathy and reciprocity (Sorensen and Oyser-
man 2009). Since fulfilment of one’s obligation to the group implies
giving whereas reciprocity by definition infers that one gives with the
intention to receive, people in more collectivistic countries can be
expected to more readily provide but also demand from the circle of com-
munal relationships. In more individualistic cultures, on the other hand,
people are deemed independent: they value their autonomy and prioritise
personal goals and needs over those of others (Oyserman et al. 2002;
6 N. CONKOVA ET AL.
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Hofstede et al. 2010). Applying the contrasting notions of independence
and interdependence to support patterns, we can expect that people in
more individualistic societies may seek to achieve independence
through receiving professional help, whereas in more collectivistic
societies, people may rather turn to community members when in need.
We, therefore, hypothesise that with increasing country-level individualism
people are less likely to view non-kin rather than professionals as the
optimal source of support (Hypothesis 1).
Compared with more collectivistic societies, where social relationships
and group belonging are largely prearranged and relatively fixed over
one’s life time, in more individualistic societies social relationships are
shown to be voluntary, carefully fostered and as result also greater in
number and diversity (Oyserman et al. 2002; Hofstede et al. 2010). In
other words, people in more individualistic societies are less restricted
in expanding their social connections beyond the family – the first
group in which an individual is integrated (Hofstede et al. 2010). Since
a greater number of social contacts implies a greater access to various
types of support, people in more individualistic countries may be able
to leave behind and substitute (partly) the safety net which family ties
provide. Following this rationale, we expect that with increasing
country-level individualism people are more likely to view non-kin rather
than kin as the optimal source of support (Hypothesis 2).
Since the strength of norms of family obligations signifies the extent to
which people feel that support should be exchanged between the closest
family ties – children and parents – we argue that with decreasing strength
of country-level norms of family obligations, people are more likely to view
non-kin rather than kin as the optimal source of support (Hypothesis 3).
Here, it is important to note that the predictive strength of the concept
of familialism lies in explaining whether a person is likely or not to
select kin ties as the optimal source of support. It does not, therefore,
provide clear clues as to whether people who are less likely to opt for kin
will at the same time be more likely to opt for non-kin. We feel nevertheless
safe in assuming that when strong feelings of family obligations prevail,
people are less likely to opt for any other source of support than kin.
We do not expect that the impact of cultural context differs across the
types of support under study. We do however expect that the extent to
which kin, non-kin and professionals are viewed as the optimal source
of support differs for advice and help when looking for a job. In brief,
given that in our study advice pertains to personal and family matters,
it is plausible to assume that advice is sought in the private domain or,
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in other words, the probability to opt for non-kin ties (and, for that matter,
for kin ties) is higher compared with the probability to opt for pro-
fessionals. As regards help with looking for a job, it can be expected
that both non-kin ties and professionals are more likely to serve as a
source of support compared with kin ties. Prior research has shown that
non-kin ties (Cappellari and Tatsiramos 2015) and professional services
(Gregg and Wadsworth 1996) are most useful for finding jobs through
the transmission of information about job opportunities.
4. Methodological approach
To test the hypotheses, we use data from the most recently available (2011–
2012) round of the EQLS. The EQLS is conducted every four years by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Con-
ditions. Our sample consists of 27 countries in Europe, namely the Euro-
pean Union countries, except for Hungary, Greece and Cyprus, and Serbia
and Iceland. We excluded Greece and Cyprus from the analyses due to lack
of country-level data on individualism. We omitted Hungary because it is
an outlier with extreme scores on individualism (80) and the observed
probability to select relatives as a source of support (∼90%).3 The
sample size per country varies between 1000 (Bulgaria and Slovakia) and
3055 (Germany). The age of the respondents ranges from 18 to 95 years
for the analysis pertaining to advice, and 18–60 years old for the analysis
pertaining to help with looking for a job. In the latter case, we restricted
the age range to account for the fact that in some European countries
(i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia) the retirement age for
women in 2012 was 60 years (European Commission 2012).
4.1. Dependent variables
Our analysis rests on two dependent variables reflecting two types of
support. They are based on the questions
From whom would you get support in each of the following situations: (1) if
you needed advice about a serious personal or family matter; (2) if you
3More elaborate investigation into the suspiciously high individualism score for Hungary reveals that the
country was not part of the original set of countries but was added to the database later based on sec-
ondary sources (Hofstede 2001: 502), which Hofstede himself described in a personal conversation as
raising more questions than providing answers. For the sake of a robustness check, we conducted
the analyses with Hungary as well. They yield a rather similar size of the coefficients but with slightly
different significant levels compared with the findings presented in this contribution (exact coefficients
are available upon request).
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needed help when looking for a job. For each situation, choose the most impor-
tant source of support.
The answer categories were: ‘a member of your family/relative’ (kin); ‘a
friend, neighbour or someone else who do not belong to your family or
relatives’ (non-kin); ‘a service provider, institution or organisation’ (pro-
fessionals); and ‘nobody’. Since we are interested in comparing individual
choices for receiving help from non-kin rather than kin or professionals,
we removed from our sample those who answered ‘nobody’ (2.9% of the
observations for advice, and 18.9% of the observations for help when
looking for a job). As the principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives (Hedeker 2007) holds true in our multinomial models, omitting
‘nobody’ as an alternative outcome did not affect the odds among the
remaining outcomes.
4.2. Independent variables at the country-level
Wemeasure country levels of individualism through Hofstede’s ‘Individu-
alism versus Collectivism’ index. His conceptualisation of individualism is
closely related to our theoretical framework. It stands for societies
in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look
after him- or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its oppo-
site pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to
protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. (Hofstede et al. 2010: 92)
Hofstede’s individualism index forms part of a multidimensional cultural
model, which was originally developed in the early 1970s. At this time, the
model was based on an extensive IBM database from 72 countries and
validated against 40 cross-cultural studies from various disciplines (Hof-
stede and Bond 1984). Throughout the years, Hofstede’s model has
received credit for a number of salient characteristics, including (1) the
acknowledgment of the multidimensionality of culture and (2) its persist-
ence over time,4 (3) its application at the national level, and (4) universal
coverage (Minkov and Hofstede 2011). Yet, not all scholars have been
equally positive, with a key critique addressing the representativeness of
the data. In response, further validation against World Value Survey
4Please note that although data could be deemed old, following Minkov and Hofstede (2011) we argue
that cultures do evolve but move together in more or less the same cultural direction. Hence, the cul-
tural gaps between countries remain the same. A confirmation of this proposition is provided by Ingle-
hart (2008).
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data was performed, providing evidence for the representativeness of the
ﬁnal database (Minkov and Hofstede 2013).
We obtained data on Hofstede’s individualism index from Hofstede
et al. (2010: 95–97). The index ranges from 0 to 100, where higher
scores signify higher levels of individualism. Figure 1 displays the index
of individualism per country, showing highest levels of individualism in
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy. At the other extreme
are Slovenia, Serbia and Portugal.
To our knowledge there are no ready-to-use macro-level measures of
norms of family obligations. Therefore, we generated the measure by
taking the arithmetic mean of individual-level scores. Data on norms of
family obligations were obtained from the fourth (2008) wave of the Euro-
pean Value Survey and are based on the questions ‘Which of these state-
ments best describes your views about (a) parents’ responsibilities to their
children and (b) responsibilities of adult children towards their parents
when their parents are in need of long-term care?’. The statements were
respectively ‘parents’/children’s duty is to do their best for their chil-
dren/parents even at the expense of their own well-being’ and ‘parents/
children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice
their own well-being for the sake of their children/parents’. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of familialism. Figure 2 depicts the degree
of familialism per country, showing that Denmark, Lithuania and
Finland are least familialistic, whereas Malta, Portugal and Italy are
most familialistic.
Finally, since countries with higher levels of modernisation and econ-
omic development are also known to have higher levels of individualism
(Inglehart and Baker 2000; Hofstede et al. 2010) and more modern
Figure 1. Per country index of individualism. Source: Hofstede et al. (2010)
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family attitudes (Aassve et al. 2013), we control for GDP per capita. GDP
per capita is an often used index of societal modernisation because of its
wide availability and convergence with other indices of social development
(i.e. infant mortality rate, level of education and urbanisation) (Hama-
mura 2012: 5). We derived the data on GDP per capita for 2011 from
the Eurostat database (Eurostat 2015).
4.3. Control variables at the individual-level
Given our strong focus on examining the role of cultural context in
shaping European’s views regarding the optimal source of support, we
treat individual-level characteristics merely as controls. Following theor-
etical insights into the mechanisms that govern the configuration of
support systems at the individual level (Messeri et al. 1993) and prior
research (e.g. Wenger 1990; Gelissen et al. 2012), we control for
people’s socio-economic and demographic background, living arrange-
ments, frequency of contact and relationship closeness.5
4.4. Method
The categorical nature of our dependent variables combined with the hier-
archical structure of the data, where individuals (level-1) are nested in
countries (level-2), require a multilevel multinomial model. We estimate
three random-intercept models for each of the dependent variables. First,
we estimate the model with level-1 controls only (Model 1). The ‘level-1
Figure 2. Per country levels of familialism. Source: European Value Survey, round 4
(2008)
5For detailed information about individual-level variables, please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix.
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only’model serves as a base-line model and informs us about the variance at
the country level.6 The intra-class correlation or the percentage of the var-
iance in the probability of selecting any of the categories relative to non-kin
(reference category) that is due to country-level characteristics is also calcu-
lated based on the ‘level-1 only’model. Subsequently, we estimate the com-
bined model including both measures of cultural context (Model 2). As a
final step, we add to the model GDP per capita (Model 3).7 Since our depen-
dent variables have 3 unordered categories, we have two sets of fixed and
random coefficients. The fixed effects are presented as odds ratios,
meaning that coefficients below 1 signify a negative relationship and coeffi-
cients above 1 signify a positive relationship. For the readers’ ease, we
present the final model’s results in two separate tables, one reflecting the
impact of context (Table 1) and the other reflecting the impact of individ-
ual-level characteristics (Table A2, to be found in the Appendix).
5. Results
5.1. European country differences in non-kin support
We turn to the observed probabilities of selecting kin, non-kin or pro-
fessionals to gauge European country differences in the extent to which
people view friends, neighbours and other non-relatives as the optimal
source of support. Our data reveal fairly different patterns for advice
and help when looking for a job. For advice, and in Europe as a whole,
the observed probability to select non-kin as the optimal source of
support (22%) is lower than that of kin (74%) but higher than the prob-
ability of selecting professionals (4%). This pattern persists at the
country level as well, with some noticeable differences in the degree of
reliance on non-kin ties. As can be seen in Figure 3, the highest probabil-
ities for advice from non-relatives are observed in Austria, Germany,
Denmark and Italy (around 30%). The lowest probabilities are found in
Malta and Romania (around 11%).
For help with looking for a job, we find that in Europe as a whole the
probability to view non-relatives as the optimal source of support (33%) is
6We treat the ‘level-1 only’ model rather than the ‘empty’ model as a base-line because in multinomial
multilevel models the level-1 variance is fixed to the variance of a standard logistic distribution. As a
result, unlike ordinary multilevel models, where the level-1 variance term is typically reduced as
level-1variables are included, in a multinomial multilevel model the random-effect variance becomes
larger (Hedeker 2007).
7The correlation between individualism and familialism is −0.50 (p < .01) whereas the correlation between
individualism and GDP per capita is 0.47 (p < .05). Familialism and GDP per capita are not significantly
correlated: r =−0.27.
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Table 1. Results of multilevel multinomial analysis: predicted odds ratios for selecting respectively kin and professionals over non-kin as a source of help,
macro-level estimates
Advice Help with looking for job
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Category 1: kin
(reference category: non-
kin)
Fixed effects Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Individualism (H2) 0.995 (0.986,1.004) 0.998 (0.988,1.007) 1.003 (0.993,1.012) 1.005 (0.996,1.015)
Familialism (H3) 2.484 (0.680,9.075) 2.558 (0.751,8.720) 8.507 **
(2.281,31.735)
8.703**
(2.434,31.115)
GDP per capita (logged) 0.674† (0.431,1.054) 0.674† (0.419,1.082)
Intercept 3.936***
(3.248,4.770)
3.933***
(3.256,4.749)
3.932***
(3.274,4.723)
0.678**
(0.540,0.851)
0.676***
(0.549,0.834)
0.676***
(0.550,0.830)
Random effects
Intercept 0.158*** (0.397) 0.121***
(0.346)
0.107***
(0.327)
0.174***
(0.417)
0.120*** (0.347) 0.111*** (0.336)
ICC (in %) 4.57 – – 5.02 – –
Pseudo R2 (in %) – 23.26 32.14 – 31.03 36.21
Category: professionals
(reference category: non-
kin)
Fixed Effects Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Odds ratio
(CI)
Individualism (H1) 1.020* (1.003,1.038) 1.019* (1.001,1.037) 1.022** (1.006,1.039) 1.019* (1.001,1.036)
Familialism 0.393
(0.037,4.128)
0.383 (0.037,3.970) 1.114 (0.115,10.776) 1.072
(0.114,10.111)
GDP per capita (logged) 1.336 (0.571,3.127) 1.686 (0.745,3.816)
Intercept 0.167***
(0.099,0.281)
0.167***
(0.114,0.247)
0.167***
(0.114,0.246)
0.669* (0.483,0.927) 0.668** (0.497,0.900) 0.668** (0.498,0.897)
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued.
Advice Help with looking for job
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Random effects
Intercept 0.597***
(0.773)
0.377***
(0.614)
0.369***
(0.608)
0.497***
(0.706)
0.380***
(0.617)
0.370***
(0.608)
ICC (in %) 15.36 – – 13.12 – –
Pseudo R2 (in %) – 36.90 38.19 – 23.54 25.55
Log-likelihood 60,585 60,491 60,496 36,156 36,162 36,164
Number of observations 31,797 31,797 31,797 18,774 18,774 18,774
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Note: *** p≤ .001, ** p≤ .01, * p≤ .05, † p≤ .1; numbers in parenthesis for the random effects represent standard deviation; CI: confidence interval; estimation method: restricted
penalised quasi-likelihood approximation.
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slightly lower than that of kin (39%) and slightly higher than that of pro-
fessionals (28%). As can be seen in Figure 4, however, we do not find a
common pattern across European countries. Instead, we observe great
differences between countries where the citizens of Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and Iceland have a higher probability to turn
to non-kin (between 44% and 47%) than to kin or professionals. The
role of professionals seems to be most prominent in Finland, France,
Malta, Denmark and Ireland whereas kin ties are most often selected as
Figure 3. Per country observed probabilities for advice.
Figure 4. Per country observed probabilities for help with looking for a job.
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a primary source of help when looking for a job in Spain, Portugal, Poland,
Serbia and Slovakia.
5.2. The impact of cultural context
As can be seen in Table 1, we find significant variance at the country level,
justifying our comparative approach. For both types of support, the intra-
class correlation coefficient (ICC) suggests that the variance which is due
to country-level characteristics is higher for the probability of selecting
non-kin over professionals (15.36% and 13.12%) than for the probability
of selecting non-kin over kin (4.57% and 5.02%).
Regarding the relationship between cultural context and the perceived
role of non-kin, kin and professionals as an optimal source of support, we
find fairly similar patterns for advice and help when looking for a job.
Regarding familialism, we find partial support for hypothesis 3: there
seems to exist a statistically significant, positive relationship between
decreasing strength of norms of family obligations and the likelihood
that a person will turn to non-relatives rather than relatives when
looking for a job, but not for advice.
For individualism, our results yield a statistically significant relation-
ship with the probability to select non-kin over professionals, providing
empirical support for hypothesis 1. Hence, with increasing levels of indi-
vidualism people are less likely to view non-kin rather than professionals
as the optimal source of advice and help when looking for a job. As to
hypothesis 2, we find no empirical support: Our analyses yield no statisti-
cal association between individualism and the probability to select non-
kin over kin.
Here, it is important to note that familialistic norms and individualistic
values differ not only in their predictive power when it comes to selecting
non-kin over kin or professionals, but also in their magnitude. As the
country-level of familialism increases, people are 88.5% less likely to
select non-relatives over relatives, whereas as the country-level of indivi-
dualism increases, people are 1.8% less likely to select non-kin over
professionals.8
Finally, turning to the coefficients of GDP per capita, we find that in
countries with higher GDP people are more likely to turn to non-kin
than to kin for both advice and help when looking for a job. The
8The percentages are calculated based on the log-odds produced by the final Model (3). Exact calculations
are available upon request.
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probability that people will first turn to non-kin than to professionals
seems, on the other hand, not to depend on country’s GDP per capita.
Including GDP in the final models does not change considerably the stat-
istical and substantive importance of the remaining coefficients.
6. Conclusions and discussion
This study makes two important contributions to research on support.
First, it enhances our knowledge on non-kin ties as a source of assistance
in Europe. Non-kin support has often been overlooked in comparative
work, arguably so because prior studies have been embedded in the
crowding-out and the decline of the family hypotheses where the focus
lies on formal, informal and family support. To our best knowledge, as
yet only a few comparative studies have examined (potential) non-kin
support (i.e. Höllinger and Haller 1990; Pichler and Wallace 2007;
Gesthuizen et al. 2008; Gelissen et al. 2012) and they failed to situate it
in the larger support system. We extend prior knowledge by demonstrat-
ing that when it comes to views about the optimal source of support, in
Europe as a whole non-kin ties take a middle position. Put differently,
non-relatives are more likely to be viewed as the optimal source of
support compared with professionals, but kin ties remain the most
likely source of support for both advice and help when looking for a
job. This sequence of kin, non-kin and professional help suggests that
despite the societal change which we observed in the past decades, infor-
mal caring relations have not lost their importance to professional help.
This conclusion is in line with prior work, e.g. Dykstra and Fokkema
(2011), Gelissen et al. (2012), Höllinger and Haller (1990) and Silverstein
and Bengtson (1997), which largely refuted the decline of the family and
the crowding-out hypotheses.
It is important to note, however, that this European pattern persists at
the country level only for advice, whereas for help when looking for a
job we find large differences across nations. This finding suggests that
to better understand the role of non-relatives as a source of support
in Europe, it is important to distinguish between different types of
support. Since advice and help looking for a job are non-kin pertinent
types of support, it can be argued that they have higher observed
probabilities for non-kin reliance compared with other, kin pertinent
types of support. Future research addressing different types of support
(i.e. practical and financial help) can, therefore, further advance this
field of enquiry.
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As regards country differences, prior research focusing more broadly
on informal support and social capital has suggested the existence of a
north/west-south/east divide, with southern European countries being
characterised by highest levels of family reliance and very few informal
supports outside the family (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Pichler and
Wallace 2007). Our findings roughly re-create this picture of regional
differences, whilst at the same time they provide a more nuanced view
of cross-national differences in the importance of non-kin ties as a
source of support. More specifically, for both advice and help when
looking for a job, we find high probabilities to turn to non-kin ties in
the north and west of Europe; yet, we do not find a common pattern in
the south and east of Europe. On the contrary, in these latter regions
we observe some of the lowest and some of the highest probabilities of
selecting non-relatives as a source of support. These findings potentially
suggest that commentators may need to move beyond the geographical
grouping of European countries and acknowledge within-region, and, as
suggested by Dykstra and Fokkema (2011), possibly also within-country
differences in support patterns.
The second contribution of the study lies in carefully conceptualising
and analysing cultural context. We argued that although rising individu-
alism has often been seen as a potential determinant of support patterns, it
has rarely been empirically studied. We, therefore, differentiated between
individualistic values and the often employed concept of familialistic
norms, and suggested that their effect on people’s views about the
optimal source of support may differ. Our findings substantiate this
proposition by demonstrating that the impact of individualism and
familialism is different in magnitude and opposite in direction. More
specifically, we find that with every point of increase in individualism,
people are 1.8% less likely to select non-kin over professionals, whereas
with every point of increase in familialism, people are 88.5% less likely
to select non-kin over kin. These findings lead to two important con-
clusions. First, norms seem to be of a greater importance when people
select from the pool of informal social ties – kin and non-kin – whereas
individualistic values seem to better predict one’s choice for informal
(non-kin) over formal (professional) help. This latter finding provides
support for the premise that individualism operates through the notion
of independence (Hypothesis 1).
Yet, we do not find support for the premise that individualism operates
through the notion of voluntary interactions (Hypothesis 2). A possible
explanation for this result is Triandis’ (1993) observation that in more
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individualistic countries people have larger and more diverse networks,
but their ties are also often casual and entail little emotional involvement.
Since support provision is determined not only by the number but also by
the quality of social relationships (Silverstein et al. 1995), it is plausable to
assume that individualismmay better explain differences in social network
size and composition than in sources of support.
Second, norms of family obligations seem to have a stronger impact
than individualistic values, likely so because they are more closely
linked with welfare arrangements. The institutional context is likely to
influence country levels of familialistic norms, but not individualistic
values, reinforcing norms’ predictive power. Prior research has estab-
lished clear connections between the kinds and generosity of public
provisions and espoused normative obligations towards family
members (Dykstra forthcoming). Legal obligations to provide support
to family members often coincide with familialistic norms (Haberkern
and Szydlik 2010). Aassve et al. (2013) show that individualism in the
sense of having liberal family attitudes should not be equated with a
retreat from family responsibilities. The authors argue that a longer
history of self-determination and political autonomy brings greater
opportunities to build civic values and social trust. In turn, the higher
levels of social trust generate greater confidence in substituting the
family’s safety with support found in the wider community. Europeans
are unrestricted in holding values of autonomy and independence, but
are unlikely to behave upon them unless there is an institutional
context allowing them to do so.
This study sheds new light on the importance of individualistic values
and familialistic norms in shaping Europeans’ choices for receiving help
from non-kin rather than from kin or professionals, but certain issues
remain to be illuminated. First, as cross-cultural research advances and
offers new theoretical and methodological insights into the concept of
individualism, research on support needs to devote efforts to further
develop and test hypotheses on its role in explaining country differences.
Other measures of familialistic culture, such as family values and attitudes,
may also reveal new insights into support patterns. Up until now, family
values, which are deep-rooted and only weakly influenced by welfare
arrangements, have been primarily used in demographic research as
they pertain to the importance of marriage and children (Van de Kaa
1994). Family attitudes, on the other hand, are about gender roles and
therefore, have been primarily used in research on parenting and house-
hold division of labour (Poortman and van der Lippe 2009). Both
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family values and attitudes are an important proxy of familialistic culture
and may reveal new insights into the field of sources of support.
Future research on non-kin ties as a source of support may also benefit
from establishing whether these cross-national differences hold true when
considering actual rather than potential support. Although often neg-
lected, distinguishing between anticipated and actual support is informa-
tive. When relying on questions about potential support, actual support
can be under- or overestimated (Adams 1986). Actual support depends
more strongly on the availability of sources of support than does antici-
pated support (Broese van Groenou and De Boer 2016), and thus might
reveal different geographical patterns.
Following Gelissen et al. (2012) we also suggest that future research
may benefit from new improved data which contain a greater number
of countries and allow, therefore, to examine the impact of culture and
welfare provisions simultaneously, as well as other potential covariates
such as generalised trust, trust in institutions and labour market character-
istics. All these characteristics are shown to be less favourable in countries
in eastern and southern Europe than in countries in western and northern
Europe (Ledeneva 1998; van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Nannestad 2008)
and may, therefore, prove to be important in explaining country differ-
ences in European’s views about the optimal source of support. To take
the example of labour markets, it is only logical to assume that when pro-
fessional services are provided, people will be more likely to use them even
in countries with high levels of familiastic norms because professional ser-
vices are particularly useful for the transmission of information about job
opportunities (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996).
To understand the causal link between context and support patterns,
as well as the link between cultural contexts and other potential covari-
ates, it is necessary to employ longitudinal data. More dynamic statistical
models, such as multilevel structural equation models (Rabe-Hesketh
et al. 2004) will be suitable to examine and better understand the
relationship between culture, other contextual explanations and social
support. The interaction between social support and context is a
complex phenomenon that merits a better understanding in comparative
sociological research.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of model variables.
Variable Observations Mean/proportion SD Range
Country-level characteristics
Individualism 27 57.41 17.94 0–100
Familialism 27 0.68 0.13 0–1
GDP per capita 27 24,555 11,363 8700–68,100
Individual-level characteristicsa
Age 36,509 50.64 18.02 18–95b
Male 36,509 0.57 0/1
Urban 36,444 0.52 0/1
Satisfaction with social life 36,021 7.20 2.18 1–10
Satisfaction with family life 36,061 7.96 2.11 1–10
Contact with relatives 35,637 9.62 8.15 0–25
Contact with non-kin 36,424 13.79 10.34 0–25
Living alone 36,509 0.23 0/1
Living with non-kin 36,200 0.01 0/1
Number of children 36,328 1.58 1.31 0–10
Married 36,308 0.60 0/1
Education 36,360 3.11 1.33 0–6
aDescriptive statistics at the individual level are combined for both datasets used for the analysis.
bThe age range for the analysis pertaining to help when looking for a job is 18–60.
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Table A2. Results of multilevel multinomial analysis: predicted odds ratios for selecting respectively kin and professionals over non-kin as a source of
support, individual-level estimates.
Advice Help when looking for a job
Reference category: non-kin Kin Professionals Kin Professionals
Fixed effects Odds ratio (CI) Odds ratio (CI) Odds ratio (CI) Odds ratio (CI)
Male 0.909*** (0.858,0.962) 0.842* (0.743,0.955) 1.285*** (1.196,1.382) 1.258*** (1.165,1.358)
Age 1.015*** (1.013,1.017) 1.020*** (1.016,1.024) 0.991*** (0.988,0.995) 1.008*** (1.005,1.012)
Urban 0.888*** (0.838,0.941) 0.859* (0.756,0.977) 0.844*** (0.784,0.909) 0.935† (0.865,1.011)
Living alone 0.824*** (0.751,0.903) 0.886 (0.715,1.099) 0.726*** (0.638,0.827) 0.820** (0.721,0.934)
Living with non-kin 0.814† (0.651,1.019) 0.511† (0.246,1.058) 0.781† (0.599,1.017) 0.668** (0.495,0.902)
Contact with relatives 1.025*** (1.021,1.029) 0.990* (0.981,0.999) 1.016*** (1.012,1.021) 0.995* (0.990,1.000)
Contact with non-kin 0.991*** (0.988,0.994) 0.986*** (0.980,0.992) 0.995** (0.991,0.999) 0.996* (0.992,0.999)
Satisfaction with family life 1.153*** (1.134,1.172) 0.982 (0.949,1.017) 1.053*** (1.030,1.076) 1.041*** (1.018,1.065)
Satisfaction with social life 0.970*** (0.955,0.986) 0.895*** (0.865,0.926) 1.003 (0.983,1.024) 0.931*** (0.911,0.951)
Number of children 1.064*** (1.036,1.092) 1.092*** (1.039,1.149) 0.983 (0.947,1.020) 1.052** (1.013,1.092)
Married 1.399*** (1.292,1.514) 1.248* (1.030,1.513) 1.100 † (0.996,1.214) 0.797*** (0.717,0.886)
Education 0.887*** (0.867,0.907) 0.925** (0.882,0.971) 0.841*** (0.815,0.867) 0.939*** (0.909,0.969)
Notes: *** p≤ .001, ** p≤ .01, * p≤ .05, † p≤ .1; CI = confidence interval; Estimates stem from the final models, which include all country-level variables (individualism, familialism and
GDP) and individual-level controls.
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